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A Note on Local Public Good Induced Spillovers between a 
Leading and a Lagging Region 
Abstract 
We analyze spatial spillovers in an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a 
lagging region where the spillovers stem from the provision of a local public good. Specifically, 
if the leading region provides the public good then the lagging region obtains some spillover 
benefits and vice versa. We first solve for the Nash equilibrium levels of the local public goods 
in the two regions when public investment decisions are simultaneous; next, we determine the 
equilibrium welfare levels in each region. Second, on the assumption that the public investment 
decisions are centralized, we compute the levels of the local public goods that maximize 
aggregate welfare. Finally, we describe an interregional transfer scheme that leads each region to 
choose non-cooperatively in a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as those that 
arise when aggregate welfare is maximized.  
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1. Introduction 
 Regional scientists now clearly comprehend the point that irrespective of whether one 
studies a developed or a developing nation, all manner of inequalities exist in the different 
regions that make up the nation under consideration. This comprehension has given rise to great 
interest in examining the characteristics of leading and lagging regions. As pointed out by 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014a), in this two-part classification, lagging regions are generally not 
dynamic, they are often rural or peripheral or remote, they are technologically backward, and 
they display slow rates of economic growth. In contrast, leading regions are typically dynamic, 
they are often urban and centrally located, they are technologically more advanced, and they 
display relatively rapid rates of economic growth. We now have a fairly large literature on 
leading and lagging regions. Therefore, before we proceed to the specific contributions of this 
note, let us first briefly survey this literature.  
 Desmet and Ortin (2007) study uneven development in a model with two regions and two 
sectors. In their model, whether the lagging or the leading region profits from technological 
change is uncertain. Because of the presence of this kind of randomness, these researchers 
demonstrate that it may make sense for the lagging region to remain underdeveloped. Chronic 
labor shortages in the remote regions of Queensland, Australia are the focus of Becker et al. 
(2013). They point out that the remoteness of the regions under study makes it difficult to attract 
and retain labor. Hence, businesses and communities will need to work together to ameliorate the 
problems created by these acute labor shortages. 
 Dawid et al. (2014) study the effect of policies designed to foster technology adoption 
and improvements in the human capital stock, on the economic performance of what they call 
stronger and weaker regions. They demonstrate that the impact of such policies depends 
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fundamentally on the extent to which the labor markets in the two regions are integrated. 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014b) examine the economic performance of lagging and leading 
regions when there is a technology gap between these two regions. Their analysis demonstrates 
that in spite of the existence of the technology gap, on the balanced growth path (BGP), the 
physical to effective human capital ratio is identical in both regions. Batabyal and Nijkamp 
(2018) study an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region. They show that 
relative to the leading region, the lagging region’s initial economic disadvantages are magnified 
on the BGP.  
 Three recent papers have shed some light on the topic of spatial spillovers between 
leading and lagging regions. Kalirajan (2004) studies the economic performance of leading and 
lagging states in India. He contends that the quality of the available human capital and 
infrastructure will determine the extent to which there are growth spillover effects from the 
leading to the lagging states. Smulders (2004) analyzes an endogenous growth model where the 
two regions being studied are countries. Ho shows that capital market integration hurts (aids) the 
leading (lagging) region if domestic spillovers are more salient than international spillovers and 
differences in research and development (R&D) are small. Finally, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi (2008) analyze an empirical model of R&D, spillovers, innovation, and the genesis of 
regional growth in Europe. They point out that a key role of spillovers relates to the transmission 
of economically productive knowledge. Even so, it is important to comprehend that these 
spillovers are subject to potent distance decay effects.  
 The various studies discussed in the preceding three paragraphs have certainly advanced 
aspects of our understanding of the working of leading and lagging regions in different parts of 
the world. Even so, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies in the extant literature that 
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have examined the working of leading and lagging regions when (i) there are spatial spillovers 
between these two regions and (ii) the source of these spillovers is the level of public investment 
in a local public good.3 
Given this lacuna in the literature, the objective of this note is to analyze the nature of the 
spatial spillovers in an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region. The 
spillovers stem from the provision of a local public good. What this means is that if the leading 
region provides the public good then the lagging region obtains some spillover benefits and vice 
versa. Section 2 delineates the theoretical framework. Section 3 first solves for the Nash 
equilibrium levels of the local public goods in the two regions when the public investment 
decisions are simultaneous. Next, this section determines the equilibrium welfare level in each 
region. On the assumption that the public investment decisions are centralized, section 4 
computes the levels of the local public goods that maximize aggregate welfare. Section 5 
describes an interregional transfer scheme that leads each region to choose non-cooperatively in 
a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as those that arise in section 4. Section 6 
concludes and then discusses two ways in which the research delineated in this note might be 
extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 Consider an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region. Following 
the nomenclature in Batabyal and Nijkamp (2018), we denote the leading region with the 
subscript ܮ and the lagging or remote region with the subscript ܴ. The government in each of 
these two regions can undertake some public investment in a local public good. This investment 
improves the quality of the lives and hence the welfare of the people living in these two regions. 
                                                            
3  
As noted by Hindriks and Myles (2013, p. 208), a local public good “has the feature that its benefits are restricted to a particular 
geographical area and it cannot be enjoyed outside of that area.” 
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In the model of this note, public investment in either of the two regions under study leads to 
some spatial spillovers. In other words, if the leading region ሺܮሻ provides the local public good 
then the lagging region ሺܴሻ obtains some spillover benefits and vice versa.  
In principle, the local public good in the two regions can be any one of several 
possibilities including, but not limited to, the provision of police, the provision of radio and 
television signals, and the provision of a public park. However, for concreteness, in the 
remainder of this note we shall think of the local public good as public education. As such, the 
spillovers we have mentioned arise from the fact that it is possible for a citizen of the leading 
(lagging) region to migrate and either work or live in the lagging (leading) region.4 Now, in 
reality, we expect most of the spillovers to be experienced by the leading region because many 
more citizens from the lagging region are likely to migrate to the leading region in search of 
better economic opportunities. Even so, in the interest of generality, we allow the spillovers to 
exist from the lagging to the leading and from the leading to the lagging regions.  
Finally, let ݃௅ and ݃ோ denote the public good levels in the leading and in the lagging 
regions. In addition, let the welfare function in each region be given by 
ܷ௜൫݃௜, ݃௝൯ ൌ 2൛ߙඥ݃௜ ൅ ߚඥ݃௜݃௝ൟ െ ߛ݃௜,    (1) 
for ݅ ് ݆, ݅, ݆ ൌ ܮ, ܴ, ߙ ൐ 0, and ߛ ൐ ߚ ൐ 0. Our next task is to solve for the Nash equilibrium 
levels of the local public goods in the two regions when the public investment decisions are 
simultaneous. 
3. The Nash Equilibrium Local Public Good Levels 
 In this section, the governments in the leading and in the lagging regions make their 
public investment decisions simultaneously. We know that the welfare level in region ݅ as a 
                                                            
4  
We shall use the terms “local public good” and “public education” interchangeably in the remainder of this note. 
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function of the two public good levels ݃௜ and ݃௝ is given by equation (1). Therefore, 
differentiating both sides of equation (1) with respect to ݃௜ gives us  
 
డ௎೔ሺ௚೔,௚ೕሻ
డ௚೔ ൌ
ఈ
ඥ௚೔ ൅
ఉ௚ೕ
ඥ௚೔௚ೕ െ ߛ.      (2) 
 
Simplifying equation (2), the first-order necessary condition for the optimal choice of ݃௜ is 
 
ఈ
ඥ௚೔ ൅
ఉ௚ೕ
ඥ௚೔௚ೕ ൌ ߛ.       (3) 
 
Equation (3) can also be expressed as 
ߙ ൅ ߚඥ݃௝ ൌ ߛඥ݃௜.       (4) 
Given equation (4), the best response function of the government in region ݅ to public 
good level ݃௝ is 
 
݃௜ ൌ ሺఈାఉඥ௚ೕሻ
మ
ఊమ .       (5) 
 
Similarly, the best response function of the government in region ݆ to public good level ݃௜ is 
 
݃௝ ൌ ሺఈାఉඥ௚೔ሻ
మ
ఊమ .       (6) 
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Now, the Nash equilibrium levels of the two regional public goods ݃௅ and ݃ோ are given 
by solving equations (5) and (6) simultaneously. That said, the reader should note that because of 
the symmetry in our theoretical framework, we can write the two Nash equilibrium levels we 
seek as ݃௅ ൌ ݃ோ ൌ ݃ோ which solves, after dropping the subscripts, the equation 
ߙ ൅ ߚඥ݃ ൌ ߛඥ݃.       (7) 
Simplifying equation (7), we get a distinct value for ݃ோ and that value is  
 
݃ோ ൌ ቀ ఈఊିఉቁ
ଶ ൐ 0,       (8) 
 
for ߙ ൐ 0 and ߛ ൐ ߚ ൐ 0. Inspecting equation (8) we see that there is no corner solution in our 
model. In other words, it is optimal in both the leading and in the lagging region to provide a 
strictly positive level of the local public good that is public education.  
 Our second and final task in this section is to ascertain the equilibrium welfare level in 
each region. We do this in three steps. First, substitute the result in equation (8) into the leading 
and the lagging region welfare functions given in equation (1). This gives us  
ܷ௜ሺ݃ோ, ݃ோሻ ൌ 2൛ߙඥ݃ோ ൅ ߚඥ݃ோ, ݃ோ	ൟ െ ߛ݃ோ.  (9) 
Second, using equation (8), equation (9) can be simplified. This simplification yields  
 
ܷ௜ሺ݃ோ, ݃ோሻ ൌ 2ߙ ቀ ఈఊିఉቁ ൅ ሺ2ߚ െ ߛሻ ቀ
ఈ
ఊିఉቁ
ଶ.   (10) 
 
Finally, simplifying equation (10), we get  
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ܷ௜ሺ݃ோ, ݃ோሻ ൌ ߛ ቀ ఈఊିఉቁ
ଶ ൐ 0.     (11) 
 
Inspecting equations (8) and (11) we see that because the Nash equilibrium levels of 
public education in the two regions are positive, so is the equilibrium level of welfare in each of 
the two regions under study. In addition, the equilibrium welfare level in each region is a 
constant multiple of the Nash equilibrium public education levels. In symbols, we have ܷ௜ሺ∙,∙ሻ ൌ
ߛ݃ோ. We now proceed to compute the levels of the local public goods that maximize aggregate 
welfare on the assumption that the public investment decisions in the leading and in the lagging 
regions are centralized.  
4. Aggregate Welfare 
 Aggregate or total welfare in the two regions under study is given by ܷ௅ሺ݃௅, ݃ோሻ ൅
ܷோሺ݃ோ, ݃௅ሻ.	 This specification tells us that mathematically, the task before us is to solve 
݉ܽݔ൛௚ಽ,௚ೃൟܷ௅ሺ݃௅, ݃ோሻ ൅ ܷோሺ݃ோ, ݃௅ሻ.    (12) 
The two first-order necessary conditions for an optimum are given by 
 
డ௎ಽሺ∙,∙ሻ
డ௚ಽ ൅
డ௎ೃሺ∙,∙ሻ
డ௚ಽ ൌ ቀ
ఈ
√௚ಽ ൅
ఉ௚ೃ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ െ ߛቁ ൅
ఉ௚ೃ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ ൌ 0,   (13) 
 
and 
 
డ௎ೃሺ∙,∙ሻ
డ௚ೃ ൅
డ௎ಽሺ∙,∙ሻ
డ௚ೃ ൌ ቀ
ఈ
√௚ೃ ൅
ఉ௚ಽ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ െ ߛቁ ൅
ఉ௚ಽ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ.   (14) 
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Observe that in both equations (13) and (14), the last ratio term denotes the spillover 
benefit that accrues to each region from the provision of the local public good. We can now write 
these two equations differently. This gives us  
 
ఈ
√௚ಽ ൅
ଶఉ௚ೃ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ ൌ
ఈ
√௚ೃ ൅
ଶఉ௚ಽ
√௚ಽ௚ೃ ൌ ߛ.     (15) 
 
Inspection of equation (15) and some thought together tell us that the solution we seek must be 
symmetric. In other words, it must be the case that we have ݃௅ ൌ ݃ோ ൌ ݃஺ where the subscript ܣ 
denotes the fact that we are now studying the “aggregate welfare” maximization case. Using this 
preceding condition, we reason that the optimal local public good levels in the leading and in the 
lagging regions solve 
 
ఈ
√௚ ൅ 2ߚ ൌ ߛ,        (16) 
 
where we have omitted the subscripts because of symmetry. Simplifying equation (16), we 
obtain  
 
݃஺ ൌ ቀ ఈఊିଶఉቁ
ଶ ൐ ݃ோ,      (17) 
 
and we suppose that ߛ ൐ 2ߚ. 
Equation (17) tells us that in the Nash equilibrium studied in section 3, there is 
underprovision of the local public good (public education) in the two regions under study. This 
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underprovision result arises because in the case studied in section 3, the government in the 
leading (lagging) region ignores the spatial spillover benefit stemming from its provision of 
public education for the lagging (leading) region. Our final task in this note is to delineate an 
interregional transfer scheme that leads the government in each region to choose non-
cooperatively in a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as those we have obtained 
in this section. 
5. An Interregional Transfer Scheme 
 The interregional transfer scheme we have in mind is based on public investment in the 
other region that induces each of the two regions to select non-cooperatively in a Nash 
equilibrium the same public investment levels as those obtained in section 4. To this end, 
suppose that each region ݅, ݅ ൌ ܮ, ܴ, receives a subsidy ߪ௜ per unit of the provision of the local 
public good ݃௜. 5 In this case, the ݅ݐ݄ region’s welfare is 
ܷ௜൫݃௜, ݃௝൯ ൅ ߪ௜݃௜.       (18) 
As such, the first-order necessary condition for an optimum for the leading region---see 
equations (2) and (3)---becomes  
 
డ௎ಽሺ௚ಽ,௚ೃሻ
డ௚ಽ ൅ ߪ௅ ൌ 0.       (19) 
 
Now if we set the subsidy equal to the spillover benefit so that ߪ௅ ൌ ߲ܷோሺ∙,∙ሻ ߲݃௅⁄ ൐ 0, then we 
obtain  
 
                                                            
5  
We do not model the manner in which this subsidy is financed. One possibility is that the subsidy is financed through a lump-sum 
tax.  
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డ௎ಽሺ௚ಽ,௚ೃሻ
డ௚ಽ ൅
డ௎ೃሺ௚ೃ,௚ಽሻ
డ௚ಽ ൌ 0.      (20) 
 
From equation (13), we know that equation (20) represents the condition for the efficient 
provision of the local public good. Therefore, by setting the subsidy equal to the spillover 
benefit, we can alter the Nash equilibrium studied in section 3 and ensure an efficient allocation 
of public investment in the leading and in the lagging regions. This completes our discussion of 
spillovers between a leading and a lagging region induced by the provision of a local public 
good.  
6. Conclusions 
 In this note, we analyzed spatial spillovers in an aggregate economy consisting of a 
leading and a lagging region where the source of the spillovers was the provision of a local 
public good. In particular, if the leading region provided the public good then the lagging region 
obtained some spillover benefits and vice versa. We first solved for the Nash equilibrium levels 
of the local public goods in the two regions when public investment decisions were 
simultaneous; next, we determined the equilibrium welfare levels in each region. Second, on the 
supposition that the public investment decisions were centralized, we calculated the levels of the 
local public goods that maximized aggregate welfare. Finally, we described a subsidy based 
interregional transfer scheme that led the government in each region to choose non-cooperatively 
in a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as the ones that arose when decision 
making about public investment was centralized.  
 The analysis in this note can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
two potential extensions. First, it would be useful to analyze how differences in the magnitudes 
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of the two spillover benefit terms influence migration decisions between the leading and the 
lagging regions. Second, it would be helpful to explicitly model the financing of the subsidy and 
to study how a “revenue neutrality” condition affects interactions between the leading and the 
lagging regions. Studies that analyze these facets of the underlying problem about economic 
differences between leading and lagging regions will provide additional insights into the 
connections between remote versus central location on the one hand and the efficient provision 
of local public goods on the other.  
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